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CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR-
MAKING UNDER THE WAR POWERS ACT: THE STATUS
OF A LEGISLATIVE VETO AFTER CHADHA
When compared to the debate over the threat posed by American
and Soviet capability to commence a full-scale nuclear exchange at a
moment's notice, discussion of the Constitution's allocation of war pow-
ers between Congress and the President has an anachronistic ring to it.
Yet, notwithstanding the spectre of rapid deployment by either of the
superpowers, the allocation of certain war powers to Congress contin-
ues to be an important consideration in presidential foreign policy deci-
sions. As the Vietnam experience suggests, the success or failure of a
presidential deployment of military personnel and war materiel in hos-
tilities outside the United States is likely to hinge on whether and to
what extent the President is able to obtain the support and cooperation
of Congress."
In the wake of several presidentially initiated military actions dur-
ing the last thirty years, debate has raged over whether the President or
Congress is entrusted with the "war powers."2 Since the final years of
the Vietnam War, politicians and commentators have sought to recon-
cile the constitutional delegation of war powers to Congress with the
historical practice of presidential deployment of military forces in for-
eign conflicts without congressional approval.8
1 See Bickel, Congress, the President and the Power to Wage War, 48 CHI-
KENT L. REV. 131, 147 (1971) ("[I]f Congress won't take the country into war, Presi-
dents . . . are only heading for failure.").
2 The term "war powers" refers both to the power to declare and wage war and
to the powers exercised by the government over the populace in times of war. This
Comment focuses on the allocation of the power to declare and wage war between the
executive and legislative branches and does not address the question of what limits are
to be placed upon the governmental exercise of war powers. See generally C. A. BER-
DAHL, WAR POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1921)
("[S]tatesmen and commentators have held that since it is impossible to foresee what
may be the exigencies or circumstances endangering the public safety, therefore 'no
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed,' and none are imposed upon the so-called
war powers. . . . [T]he war powers . . . are limited only by the laws and usages of
nations." (footnotes omitted)).
3 For an historical overview of major United States armed actions overseas and
associated congressional action, see FOREIGN AFFAIRS DIV., LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE
SERv., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON NAT'L SEC. POLICY AND SCI-
ENTIFIC DEvs. OF THE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 91ST CONG. 2D SESS., BACK-
GROUND INFORMATION ON THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES 39-49 (Comm. Print 1970); see also Wormuth, Tfie Vietnam War: The
President Versus the Constitution, reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, 91ST CONG., 2D SESS., DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE WAR POWER OF CON-
(1217)
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In 1973, in an effort to exercise control over "presidential" wars,
Congress enacted the War Powers Act." Its passage signaled a reversal
of previous congressional acquiescence in the presidential use, without
congressional authorization, of military power in pursuit of foreign pol-
icy objectives. 5 Some in Congress saw the Act as effecting even more
fundamental changes. One congressman stated that the task before
Congress was to draw "upon the experience of Vietnam to call for a
basic reappraisal of the way this Nation involves itself in war" and to
restore the "proper constitutional balance between Congress and the
President."'
The War Powers Act requires the President in every possible in-
stance to consult with Congress before introducing United States forces
into hostilities and to submit a written report within forty-eight hours
of utilizing American forces in certain military activities absent a decla-
ration of war.7 The Act's most controversial aspects are the termination
provisions. The Act requires that within sixty days of the expiration of
the forty-eight hour reporting period the President must terminate the
deployment of forces unless Congress has affirmatively authorized such
use.8 Furthermore, the Act provides that at any time Congress can di-
rect the President by concurrent resolution to remove United States
forces from hostilities.
9
The recent Supreme Court decision in Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service v. Chadha1° has raised concerns about the Act's concur-
rent resolution provision, which enables Congress to terminate a presi-
dential military deployment. Although Congress has yet to invoke the
concurrent resolution provision, the constitutionality of this provision
stands at issue because of its resemblance to the legislative veto declared
GRESS, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND THE WAR IN
INDOCHINA 142 (Comm. Print 1970).
' War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). This
Comment will refer to the statute as the "War Powers Act" to distinguish it from the
various case-by-case congressional resolutions that are part of the enforcement of the
statute.
5 The stated purpose of the Act is to "insure that the collective judgment of both
the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed
Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
dearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostil-
ities or in such situations." 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (1976).
War Powers Legislation, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. Policy
and Scientific Dev. of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Hearings, War Powers Legislation]
(statement of Rep. Dante Fascell).
7 50 U.S.C. §§ 1542, 1543 (1976).
S Id. § 1544(b).
Id. § 1544(c).
10 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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unconstitutional in Chadha.11
This Comment analyzes the constitutionality of the Act's concur-
rent resolution provision in light of the principles articulated by the
Supreme Court in Chadha. Part I discusses the factors that motivated
passage of the War Powers Act and reviews the specific provisions of
the Act, focusing on the concurrent resolution provision.
The second part of the Comment looks at Chadha. It outlines the
Court's reasoning and identifies two principles that emerge from
Chadha and that threaten the concurrent resolution provision of "the
War Powers Act. This part closes with the suggestion that the applica-
bility of the Chadha principles to the Act will depend upon two factors:
(1) the constitutional allocation of the war powers between Congress
and the President, and (2) the effect of congressional exercise of the
termination provision in the War Powers Act on that allocation.
Part III considers the first factor, the constitutional allocation of
war powers. It concludes that there are two credible views as to how
these powers are apportioned between the executive and legislative
branches. First, the powers may be under the exclusive control of Con-
gress, with only narrow exceptions for unilateral presidential action.
Alternatively, the powers may be shared, with the President enjoying
much greater latitude to employ military force without congressional
approval.
Part IV considers the second factor, the operative effect of the War
Powers Act. Drawing on the two perspectives discussed in part III, this
part suggests three different interpretations of the impact of the Act on
the constitutional allocation of the war powers between the branches.
Finally, part V discusses the constitutionality of the Act's concur-
rent resolution provision. It measures the effect of congressional exer-
cise of the provision, as suggested by each of the three interpretations of
the Act mentioned in part IV, against the principles articulated in
Chadha and discussed in part II. This part demonstrates how, in light
of Chadha, the constitutionality of the provision will turn on the ac-
cepted interpretation of allocation of war powers between the two
11 A legislative veto is a technique used by Congress that permits it to "delegate
broad powers of domestic initiative to the President or to various agencies, subject to a
veto power exercisable by Congress as a whole, by one House, or by a committee." L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-2, at 161 (1978) (footnote omitted).
Tribe further notes, "There is some appeal in the argument that any congressional veto
of an executive or administrative act taken pursuant to a prior delegation must consti-
tute either a usurpation of the judicial function of interpreting the scope of the original
delegation, or a change in that delegation's initial scope." Id. at 162. He concludes that
finding such a technique unconstitutional would exalt rigid formulas in an area where
doctrine must be responsive to basic problems of political accountability. See id. at 162-
63.
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branches and on the operative effect of the War Powers Act.
I. CONGRESS ASSERTS ITS WAR POWERS:
THE WAR POWERS ACT
Events during the Vietnam War demonstrated to Congress that
the President enjoyed tremendous discretion, even in the absence of a
formal declaration of war, to continue American involvement in mili-
tary hostilities once the President had seized the initiative. Two forces
moved Congress to take action to limit presidential war-making: a con-
cern that no war could successfully be conducted without popular ap-
proval and a realization that the courts would not limit presidential
war-making.
A. Political Need for Congressional Involvement in the
Exercise of the War Powers
By vesting the power to declare war in Congress, 2 the Framers
clearly intended to make the commitment of the nation to war an ex-
traordinary exercise of the popular will. In the words of Justice Story,
[T]he power of declaring war is not only the highest sover-
eign prerogative, but that it is, in its own nature and effects,
so critical and calamitous, that it requires the utmost deliber-
ation, and the successive review of all the councils of the na-
tion. . . . The representatives of the people are to lay the
taxes to support a war, and therefore have a right to be con-
sulted as to its propriety and necessity. The executive is to
carry it on, and therefore should be consulted as to its time,
and the ways and means of making it effective."3
The truth of Justice Story's admonition that committing the coun-
try to war requires the utmost deliberation and the review of all coun-
cils of the nation was revealed by the experience of presidential war-
making in Vietnam. During the final tumultuous years of the war in
Southeast Asia, the Nixon administration sought "consultation, mutual
trust and continuing political interaction" among Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the electorate.1 4 The intensity of public protest against the
war, however, combined with congressional inability to legislate a de-
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1171 (T. Cooley 4th ed. 1873).
4 See Hearings, War Powers Legislation, supra note 6, at 53-54 (statement of
John R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State).
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escalation,1 5 had a marked effect on Congress. This was best described
by Alexander Bickel, who wrote that "[tihe one thing we and the world
have learned from the Vietnam experience is that without understand-
ing why we fight, and without the will to fight as a nation, we cannot
fight effectively."'
B. The Courts Refuse to Place Limits on
Presidential War-Making
In 1964 Congress delegated broad war-making authority to Presi-
dent Johnson with passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution;17 in 1971,
however, it repealed the Resolution.' 8 Thereafter, many suits were filed
in which the courts were requested to enjoin further prosecution of the
war on the grounds that continued military action in Vietnam was un-
constitutional because the President was acting without requisite con-
gressional authority. The courts uniformly denied these requests, refus-
ing to place limits on presidential war powers.
In one line of cases, the courts found that, contrary to the asser-
tions of the plaintiffs, Congress had given its blessing to the war ef-
fort.' 9 These courts found that various actions taken by Congress could
be interpreted as endorsing continued military action and, thus, that the
President was not acting without congressional authorization. 0
15 For a summary of congressional efforts to de-escalate American involvement in
Vietnam, see A. THOMAS & A. THOMAS, JR., THE WAR-MAKING POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT 119-28 (1982).
" Bickel, supra note 1, at 147.
17 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), repealed
by Foreign Military Sales Act, Pub. L. No. 91-72, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055 (1971).
According to § 2 of the Resolution,
The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to
world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in South-
east Asia .... [Tihe United States is, therefore, prepared, as the Presi-
dent determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed
force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
1I See Foreign Military Sales Act, Pub. L. No. 91-72, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055
(1971).
1 See Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1971); DaCosta v. Laird,
448 F.2d 1368, 1369-70 (2d Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039,
1042-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp.
854 (D. Mass. 1973).
20 See supra note 19. In addition to relying on appropriations and extension of the
draft law, the Nixon administration based its contention of congressional authorization
on Senate ratification of the Southeast Asia Treaty and the United Nations Charter,
arguing that ratification of these treaties effectively had delegated war-making author-
ity to the President. See Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and the Power to De-
clare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 21 (1972).
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Orlando v. Laird21 exemplifies this approach. In Orlando the
Second Circuit rejected the contention that the repeal of the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution nullified the President's authority to continue the war.
It noted that "[tihe repeal was based on the proposition that the Reso-
lution was no longer necessary and amounted to no more than a gesture
on the part of the Congress at the time the executive had taken sub-
stantial steps to unwind the conflict.""2 The court also considered con-
gressional action extending conscription and appropriating funds for
the war.23 It concluded that there was sufficient evidence that "Con-
gress and the Executive have taken mutual and joint action in the pros-
ecution and support of military operation in Southeast Asia from the
beginning of those operations" '24 to support a judicial inference that
Congress had authorized the President's actions.
According to the court, congressional authorization of presidential
war-making need not be explicit. It reasoned that the "framers' intent
to vest the war power in Congress was in no way defeated by permit-
ting an inference of authorization from legislative action furnishing the
manpower and materials of war."25 Refusing to impose a fixed process
or fixed standards upon Congress's war-making authority, the court
stated, "Beyond determining that there has been some mutual partici-
pation between the Congress and the President . . . it is clear that the
constitutional propriety of the means by which Congress has chosen to
ratify and approve the protracted military operation in Southeast Asia
is a political question."2
In a second line of cases, the courts declined even to address the
issue of the constitutionality of the continuation of the war on the
grounds that the political question doctrine rendered the cases nonjusti-
ciable.217 In Holtzman v. Schlesinger,"8 for example, the Second Circuit
21 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
2 Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1041 n.1. For the official congressional report on this
issue, see S. REP. No. 865, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6069. But see Van Alstyne, supra note 20, at 20-21 (arguing that repeal
of Tonkin Gulf Resolution removed all of President's constitutional authority to con-
tinue war effort in Southeast Asia).
2 Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1042-43.
24 Id. at 1042.
25 Id. at 1043.
26 Id.
27 See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615-16 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1311 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); see
also Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1043. See generally L. FRIEDMAN & B. NEUBORNE,
UNQUESTIONING OBEDIENCE TO THE PRESIDENT: THE ACLU CASE AGAINST THE
LEGALITY OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM (1972) (describing Berk v. Laird, companion
case to Orlando); E. KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR 60 (1982).
28 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
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wrote, "While we. . . may well agonize and bewail the horror of this
or any war, the sharing of Presidential and Congressional responsibility
at this juncture is a bluntly political and not a judicial question."29
The message of cases like Orlando and Holtzman-that the courts
would not impose limits on presidential war powers-combined with
the sentiment that successful war-making required popular support,
persuaded Congress that it needed to legislate a process and standards
for the initiation and conduct of future American military action. The
result was the War Powers Act.
C. Provisions of the War Powers Act
Despite the Nixon administration's contention that the respective
roles and capabilities of the President and Congress were best left to
the political process,30 Congress was convinced that express legislative
action was needed to redress what that body perceived as presidential
usurpation of congressional war powers. As it considered war powers
legislation during 1972 and 1973, Congress had two choices. First, it
could legislate a flat ban on presidential military deployment in all but
the most compelling circumstances. This might have been a logical re-
sponse to Orlando, but it presented obvious political and constitutional
difficulties. 1 Alternatively, Congress could steer a more moderate
course and subject presidential military deployments to closer congres-
sional scrutiny. It chose this latter option when, in 1973, over President
Nixon's veto, it enacted the War Powers Act.82
The Act seeks to circumscribe presidential use of military forces in
specific circumstances. Senator Jacob Javits, cosponsor of the Senate
bill that emerged from a joint conference committee to become the War
Powers Act, explained that "[iln this bill we are dealing with un-
declared wars-wars which have come to be called Presidential wars
because the constitutional process of obtaining Congressional authoriza-
tion has been short-circuited." 5 Therefore, ,the Act addresses situations
where, in the absence of a declaration of war, American troops are
introduced
'9 Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1311.
SO Hearings, War Powers Legislation, supra note 6, at 53-54 (statement of John
R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor of Department of State).
"I Several witnesses, in testimony before a subcommittee of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, had cautioned against imposing rigid restrictions on the President's
power to deploy military force in all situations and had argued that such restrictions
might be unconstitutional. See id. at 97-105 (statement of Professor John Norton
Moore); id. at 122, 131 (statement of Secretary of State William Rogers).
32 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
33 119 CONG. REc. 1398 (1973).
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(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent in-
volvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign na-
tion, while equipped for combat, except for deployments
which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or train-
ing of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States
Armed Forces equipped for comnbat-raleady located in a for-
eign nation .
In these situations the Act requires that the President begin reporting
to and consulting with Congress within forty-eight hours of initial
deployment.3 5
The Act also contains a declaratory section 6 stating that no provi-
sion of the Act or concurrent resolution issued under the Act shall be
construed "to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the
President""7 or to grant "any authority to the President with respect to
the introduction of the United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by
the circumstances which authority he would not have in the absence" of
the Act. 8 In the words of Senator Javits, the purpose of this nondele-
gation language is to place "the burden on the Executive to come to
Congress for specific authority."3" This language also addresses the del-
egation problem raised by cases such as Orlando by declaring that con-
gressional endorsement of introduciQn of American forces into hostili-
ties shall not be inferred from a)ny 1w or appropriations act unless
such law or act "specifically authoriies the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities. ''
The most controversial aspects of-the-Act are the two termination
provisions. The first mandates that deployment of troops be terminated
within sixty days of the commencement of the reporting period unless
Congress expressly authorizes otherwise.4' The second termination pro-
50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
I d.
36 Id. § 1547.
s Id. § 1547(d)(1).
- Id. § 1547(d)(2).
a' 119 CONG. REC. 1400 (1973).
40 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1).
41Id. § 1544(b). The Act stipulates that the President shall terminate the deploy-
ment of United States military forces within 60 days of the commencement of the re-
porting period unless the Congress: "(1) has declared war or has enacted a specific
authorization for such use. . . , (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, or (3)
is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon the United States." Id.
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vision, the focus of this Comment, enables Congress at any time, by
concurrent resolution, to direct the President to withdraw forces "en-
gaged in hostilities outside the territory of the United States, its posses-
sions and territories without a declaration of war or specific statutory
authorization.'
42
A concurrent resolution, unlike a bill or joint resolution, does not
go to the President for approval" and thus avoids the possibility of a
presidential veto of a congressional resolution directing the President to
withdraw United States forces. Furthermore, Representative Clement
Zablocki, sponsor of the House bill, noted that the choice of a
"nonvetoable method" grew out of Congress's understanding of the
Constitution's commitment to Congress of the power to declare war:
Our purpose. . . was to provide Congress with a two-barrel
approach. . . to ending a commitment of troops ordered by
the President. The first of that so-called two-barrel approach
involves the 60-day period ....
The second barrel . . . involves the concurrent resolu-
tion which we regard as a statutorily legal method of ending
the commitment of troops. The thought behind the desirabil-
ity of the concurrent resolution route is obvious: since the
Constitution gives Congress-and only Congress-the power
to declare war, Congress had to have a nonvetoable method
of demonstrating, if it so chose, that it did not wish to declare
war, even before the expiration of the 60-day period. We
recognized that the Constitution clearly states that the Presi-
dent is Commander in Chief but it also states with even
If the President "determines and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable
military necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces requires the con-
tinued use of such armed forces in the course of bringing about a prompt removal of
such forces," the initial 60-day period is extended for not more than 30 days. Id.
While not addressing the issue, this Comment assumes the 60-day limit to be con-
stitutional. For support of this position, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 103 (1972).
The Act's reporting requirements and 60-day limitation address a problem that
recurred during the Vietnam war when the executive branch acted on its own initiative
and consulted with Congress only when it required appropriations or extensions of the
draft law. See Wormuth, supra note 3, at 54-58.
These provisions infuse an element of political accountability into the actions of
both the President and Congress, see 119 CONG. REc. 1399 (1973) (statement of Sen.
Javits), an element critics of the Vietnam War found sorely lacking, see, e.g., M. Pu-
sEY, THE WAY WE Go TO WAR 8 (1969).
42 50 U.S.C. § 1544(c).
43 See H. LINDE & G. BUNN, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 131
(1976).
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greater clarity that only Congress can declare war."
However, notwithstanding the advantages the nonvetoable termi-
nation provision of the Act may offer Congress, the Supreme Court's
decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha45 raises
serious questions about the constitutionality of such a device.
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECLARES THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha
A. Background of the Case
The Chadha case' arose from deportation proceedings begun by
the Department of Justice in 1973 against Chadha, an East Indian
student whose visa had expired in 1972. An immigration judge sus-
pended the deportation after concluding that Chadha would suffer
"'extreme hardship' if deported. '47
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act,4 Congress had re-
tained the authority to review any suspension of deportation granted an
alien and provided that if
either the Senate or the House of Representatives passes a
resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the sus-
pension of such deportation, the Attorney General shall
thereupon deport such alien or authorize the alien's depar-
ture at his own expense . . . . If. . .neither the Senate nor
the House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution,
the Attorney General shall cancel deportation proceedings.49
On December 16, 1975, the House of Representatives vetoed the sus-
pension of Chadha's deportation."0 Deportation proceedings were re-
opened, and Chadha was ordered deported pursuant to the House
action.5"
Chadha appealed the refusals of the immigration judge and of the
Board of Immigration Appeals to terminate his deportation, contending
4' The War Powers Resolution: A Test of Compliance, Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Nat'l Sec. Policy and Scientific Dev. of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 93 (1975) (statement of Rep. Zablocki).
45 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
46 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
47 Id. at 2770.
" 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982).
49 Id. § 1254(c)(2), quoted in Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2771.
" Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2771.
61 Id. at 2772.
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that the congressional veto provision of the Immigration and National-
ity Act was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding that
the veto provision was unconstitutional as applied to Chadha, and or-
dered the Attorney General " 'to cease and desist from taking any steps
to deport this alien based upon the resolution enacted by the House of
Representatives.' "52 In a 7-2 opinion the Supreme Court affirmed.
B. Supreme Court Resolution-The Problem of Legislative
Overreaching
Justice Burger's majority opinion in Chadha focused on the fact
that in the Immigration and Nationality Act Congress had delegated to
the executive branch authority to administer immigration policy but
had reserved the power to withdraw or amend the delegation without
bicameral approval or presentment to the President. According to Jus-
tice Burger, Congress's seemingly ad hoc review and redefinition of the
Act's deportation standards undermined the Constitution's safeguards
against "oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered measures.""3 Al-
though it might have been a "convenient shortcut" for Congress to alter
the legal effect of executive branch actions without enacting legislation
subject to the President's approval, such a procedure offended the
Framers' "desire to define and limit the exercise of the newly created
federal powers" and the "unmistakable expression . . . that legislation
by the national Congress be a step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative
process."54 The limits upon legislative power that the Framers con-
ceived soon would evaporate if Congress could condition delegations to
the executive branch upon the retention of a prerogative for Congress to
review and extra-legislatively to veto executive branch decisions.55
The legislative veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality
Act was constitutionally objectionable because it circumvented two
clauses of the Constitution: the bicameralism and presentment require-
ments of article I.5 Congress's attempt to circumvent the presentment
requirement is the central separation of powers problem posed by the
legislative veto because it disables a coordinate branch of government
from exercising its constitutional powers. Thus, the President is unable
to exercise the power reserved to him by section 7 of article I to ap-
prove or veto congressional action:
5" Id. (quoting Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 436 (9th Cir. 1980)).
53 Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2782.
54 Id. at 2788.
55 See id. at 2787.
56 Id. at 2782-88.-
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The purpose of the presentment requirement is to establish a
salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard
the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or
of any impulse unfriendly to the public good which may
happen to influence a majority of that body . . . . The pri-
mary inducement to conferring the power in question upon
the Executive is to enable him to defend himself; the secon-
dary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community
against the passage of bad laws through haste, inadvertence
or design.
57
The Constitution requires presentment to the President of "[e]very Or-
der, Resolution, or Vote to Which the Concurrence of the Senate and
the House of Representatives may be necessary . "...-58 Whether par-
ticular congressional actions are subject to the presentment requirement
depends, according to the Chadha majority, upon whether the actions
"contain matter which is properly to be regarded as legislative in its
character and effect.' "" The Court concluded that the House resolu-
tion vetoing the suspension of Chadha's deportation was legislative "in
its character and effect" because it "altered Chadha's status" under the
immigration law. 0 The resolution therefore violated article I because it
was the legal equivalent of private legislation amending or repealing
the standards of the Immigration and Nationality Act as they applied
to Chadha:
Congress' decision to deport Chadha-no less than Congress'
original choice to delegate to the Attorney General the au-
thority to make that decision, involves determinations of pol-
icy that Congress can implement in only one way; bicameral
passage followed by presentment to the President. Congress
must abide by its delegation of authority until that delegation
is legislatively altered or revoked."1
Two principles emerge from Chadha. First, as the case holds, leg-
islative action that purports to alter the legal rights, duties, and rela-
tions of pers6ns outside the legislative branch must comply with the
constitutional procedure set forth in article I, including presentment to
" Id. at 2782 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 469-70 (A. Hamilton) (B.
Wright ed. 1961)).
58 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784 (quoting S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8
(1897)).
*o Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2784-85.
81 Id. at 2786 (footnote omitted).
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the President. Second, as the last sentence of the above quoted passage
suggests, congressional authority, once delegated to the executive, may
not be altered or revoked extra-legislatively.
It is these two principles that jeopardize the concurrent resolution
termination provision embedded in the War Powers Act. The constitu-
tionality of that provision will turn on two questions: (1) Does a con-
current resolution ordering a termination of hostilities alter the legal
rights, duties, and relations of those outside the legislative branch?, and
(2) Does such a resolution amount to an extra-legislative revocation of
previously delegated authority? To answer these questions one must
first consider the constitutional allocation of war powers between Con-
gress and the President, and then one must understand the effect of the
War Powers Act on that allocation.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ALLOCATION OF THE WAR POWERS
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
Both Congress and the President can point to text in the Constitu-
tion in support of their claims to the right to exercise the war powers.
Congress was assigned the power to declare war,6" to raise and support
armies,6" and to provide and maintain a navy." The President was
given the office of commander in chief " and the responsibility for the
nation's foreign policy. 6 This textual division of war-related powers
has spawned considerable literature debating the constitutionality of
presidential deployment of American military forces in the absence of a
congressional declaration of war. The courts, in a few cases, have also
contributed to this discussion.
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
83 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
" Id. art. I, § 8, ci. 13. In addition, many of the other powers enumerated in § 8
are arguably war powers, including the power to lay and collect taxes for the common
defense, to define and punish piracies, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, to make
rules concerning captures on land and water, to make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces, to provide for calling forth the militia, and to
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia. These powers are en-
hanced by Congress's power under the necessary and proper clause.
*5 Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (treaty-making power); id. art. II, § 3, cl. 3 (receive
ambassadors). An extremely broad reading of presidential foreign affairs power was
recognized in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
This opinion found certain inherent sovereign powers to be vested in the President.
While the President is vested with general authority to direct foreign affairs, Con-
gress has the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. See U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cI. 3.
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A. View of the Commentators
On the issue of "presidential wars," commentators have looked to
the intent of the Framers; the literature is replete with citations to the
Gerry-Madison Amendment in the Committee of Detail6 7 and to vari-
67 The key discussion of war powers in the Constitutional Convention was as
follows:
"To make war"
Mr. Pinkney opposed the vesting this power in the Legislature. Its
proceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps.
would be too numerous for such deliberations. The Senate would be the
best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most ca-
pable of proper resolution. If the States are equally represented in Senate,
so as to give no advantage to large States, the power will notwithstanding
be safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as well as the
large States. It would be singular for one- authority to make war, and
another peace.
Mr. Butler. The Objections agst the Legislature lie in a great degree
agst the Senate. He was for vesting the power in the President, who will
have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Na-
tion will support it.
Mr. M(adison) and Mr. Gerry moved to insert "declare," striking
out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden
attacks.
Mr Sharman thought it stood very well. The Executive shd. be able
to repel and not to commence war. "Make" better than "declare" the lat-
ter narrowing the power too much.
Mr Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower
the Executive alone to declare war.
Mr. Elseworth. there is a material difference between the cases of
making war, and making peace. It shd. be more easy to get out of war,
than into it. War also is a simple and overt declaration, peace attended
with intricate & secret negociations.
Mr. Mason was agst giving the power of war to the Executive, be-
cause not (safely) to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so
constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather than facili-
tating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred "declare" to "make".
On the Motion to insert declare - in place of Make, (it was agreed
to.)
N.H. no. Mas. abst. Cont. no.* Pa ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N.C.
ay. S.C. ay. Geo-ay. [Ayes-7; noes-2; absent-1.]
Mr. Pinkney's motion to strike out whole clause, disagd. to without
call of States.
Mr Butler moved to give the Legislature power of peace, as they
were to have that of war.
Mr Gerry 2ds. him. 8 Senators may possibly exercise the power if
vested in that body, and 14 if all should be present; and may consequently
give up part of the U. States. The Senate are more liable to be corrupted
by an Enemy than the whole Legislature.
On the motion for adding "and peace" after "war"
N.H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N.C.
(no) S.C. no. Geo. no. [Ayes - 0; noes - 10.]
Adjourned
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 318-19 (M. Ferrand ed.
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ous segments of the Federalist.
One group of commentators argues that Congress controls war-
making.6 For support it relies upon Alexander Hamilton's explanation
of how the British institutional arrangement of war powers would dif-
fer from that contemplated by the Constitution:
The President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and
navy of the United States. In this respect his authority would
be nominally the same with that of the king of Great Brit-
ain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to
nothing more than the supreme command and direction of
the military and naval forces, as first General and admiral of
the Confederacy; while that of the British king extends to the
declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets
and armies, -all which by the Constitution under considera-
tion would appertain to the legislature. 9
While these commentators recognize that the President may have
the authority under the commander-in-chief clause to repel attacks
against the United States, ° they reject the view that the President may
constitutionally sustain military operations without congressional
1911) (footnotes omitted). This section is cited by almost all commentators on the war
powers. See Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 29, 40 & n.85
(1972); Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, The Legality of United States
Participation in the Defense of Viet Nam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085, 1101 (1966); Lofgren,
War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 81 YALE L.J. 672,
675-76 (1972); Ratner, The Coordinated Warmaking Power-Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial Roles, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 461, 466-69 (1971); Reveley, Presidential
War-Making: Constitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1285
n.139 (1969); Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEx. L.
REV. 833, 865 (1972); Van Alstyne, supra note 20, at 6-7; Note, Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the Power to Commit Forces to Combat, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1771, 1773 &
n.16 (1968).
8 See Berger, supra note 67, at 36-46; Lofgren, supra note 67, at 699; Ratner,
supra note 67, at 469-70; Van Alstyne, supra note 20, at 9.
Professor Lofgren argues further that the allocation to Congress of the power to
grant letters of marque and reprisal was a conscious decision to vest "Congress with
control over the commencement of war, whether declared or undeclared." Lofgren,
supra note 67, at 697.
69 THE FEDERALIST No. 69, at 446 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (footnote
omitted), cited in Berger, supra note 67, at 38; Lofgren, supra note 67, at 685; Van
Alstyne, supra note 20, at 8.
While this section of The Federalist is concerned with the concentration of powers
in the federal government, rather than the division between Congress and President, it
recognizes that the nation needed flexibility to ensure national security: Professor
Ratner takes this analysis a step further to conclude that the President's power to "re-
pel sudden attack" must have a more expansive meaning in the modern world of rapid
mobilization and global interests. See Ratner, supra note 67, at 466-69.
7' This conclusion would seem inescapable given the Madison-Gerry Amendment
discussed supra note 67. See also infra note 77 and accompanying text.
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authorization."'
Other commentators assert that the President's war-making pow-
ers are broader,72 arguing that the Constitution contemplates a shared
power to wage war rather than an exclusive allocation of war powers
to the Congress. They see the Framers as pragmatists, keenly con-
cerned for the survival of the nation, and as establishing a flexible co-
operative scheme of governmental power. Again, Hamilton's views are
cited:
[I]t is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of
national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety
of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The
circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite,
and for this reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be
imposed on the powers to which the care of it is committed.73
The conclusion that these commentators draw is that the Constitu-
tion envisions a "pattern of shared constitutional authority in this vital
area . . . .[N]ot an hermetic separation of powers, but a scheme of
divided power-what Hamilton called an intermixture of powers, [is]
the only effective way to prevent a monopoly of power in any one
branch of government.1
7 4
71 See Berger, supra note 67, at 54 ("[T]he transformation of the 'repel sudden
attacks' exception of Madison and Gerry into an alleged presidential power, without
congressional authorization, to commit the armed forces to battle against invasion of
Korea or Vietnam can find no warrant either in the constitutional text or in the under-
standing of the Framers."); Lofgren, supra note 67, at 700 ("Taken together, then, the
grants to Congress of power over the declaration of war and issuance of letters of mar-
que and reprisal likely convinced contemporaries even further that the new Congress
would have nearly complete authority over the commencement of war."); Van Alstyne,
supra note 20, at 13 ("In the absence of a declaration of war by the Congress, the
President may not sustain the systematic engagement of military force abroad for any
purpose whatever.").
71 See Reveley, supra note 67, at 1283-84; Rostow, supra note 67, at 847; see also
Department of State, supra note 67, at 1100-01.
71 THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 200 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961) (empha-
sis omitted), cited in Rostow, supra note 67, at 845 n.23; see also J. JAvrrs, WHO
MAKES WAR 12 (1973) (quoting the passage and pointing out Hamilton's bias towards
executive power, which led him later to conclude that the President's foreign policy
authority could "determine the condition of the nation, though it may in its conse-
quences affect the exercise of the power of the legislature to declare war").
Many of the commentators who rationalize the President's exercise of the war
powers as part of our "living Constitution" point to the long history of presidential
war-making. See sources cited supra note 3. The Supreme Court, however, has not
accepted the concept of constitutionalization through usage. See Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) ("[plast practice does not, by itself, create power" but
only a presumption that Congress has consented to the President's actions).
7" Rostow, supra note 67 at 847; see also E. KEYNES, supra note 27; A. SOFAER,
WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER 1-60 (1976).
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B. View of the Courts
No definitive answer on the scope of presidential war-making has
been forthcoming from the courts. One early Supreme Court case indi-
cated that Congress's war powers were plenary. In Talbot v. Seeman
75
the Court stated, "The whole powers of war being, by the constitution
of the United States, vested in congress, the acts of that body can alone
be resorted to as our guides in this [inquiry into the situation between
the United States and France]."70
Such a sweeping allocation of the war powers to Congress is not
found again. In determining whether President Lincoln had the power,
without prior authorization from Congress, to institute a blockade of
the Confederate States, the Court recognized an independent constitu-
tional grant of war powers to the President:
By the Constitution, Congress alone has the power to
declare a national or foreign war . . . .[The President] has
no power to initiate or declare a war against a foreign nation
If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the
President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by
force. He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept
the challenge without waiting for any special legislative
authority.7
The most recent judicial statements on presidential war-making
came in response to challenges to American involvement in Vietnam.
Unfortunately, they contributed little to efforts to define presidential
war-making powers because, as discussed above,7 8 no case reached the
issue that the War Powers Act was intended to address: the constitu-
tionality of presidential deployment of United States troops in the ab-
sence of congressional authorization.
75 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 1 (1801). The issue in Talbot was whether Congress had
authorized a partial war against France so that French ships could be denominated
"enemy" for purposes of the law of salvage. A similar issue was litigated in Bas v.
Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 36 (1800). There, the Justices recognized that Congress could
authorize hostilities either through a declaration of war or through less formal means.
Declared war, Justice Washington stated, is perfect war. "But hostilities may subsist
between two nations, more confined in its nature and extent; being limited as to places,
persons and things; and this is more properly termed imperfect war. . . ." Id. at 40.
Neither of these cases concerned the issue of executive war-making.
78 Talbot, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 28.
77 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668 (1862). In Durand v. Hollins, 8
F. Cas 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186), the President's authority to use the
military to protect the lives and property of American citizens abroad was recognized.
78 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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Some of the cases, however, discussed the constitutional allocation
of war powers between the executive and legislative branches. Most
courts concluded that the powers were shared by the two branches,"9
although the Second Circuit suggested that "the congressional power to
declare war . . . was intended as an explicit restriction upon the power
of the Executive to initiate war on his own prerogative . ... 1
There is no consensus among the commentators or the courts as to
the constitutional allocation of war powers between Congress and the
President. Unquestionably, the President has some power to use mili-
tary force without congressional authorization, but it is unclear how
far, beyond repelling attacks, this power extends. There are two plausi-
ble views on this point. First, this power may extend no further, in
which case Congress may be seen as having exclusive control over the
war powers. Alternatively, presidential power to use military force
without congressional approval may extend to a range of circumstances,
in which case Congress and the President may be seen as sharing the
war powers. As will be discussed in part VI, whichever of these views
prevails will be important in determining the effect of Immigration and
Nationalization Service v. Chadha8l on the concurrefit resolution pro-
vision of the War Powers Act.
IV. INTERPRETING THE WAR POWERS ACT
A second factor relevant to the constitutionality of the termination
provision of the War Powers Act is the actual operative effect of the
79 See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 613-14 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[T]here are
some types of war which, without Congressional approval, the President may begin to
wage .... In such unusual situations necessity confers the requisite authority upon
the President."); Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1971) ("The Con-
stitution does not contain an explicit provision to indicate whether these interdependent
powers can properly be employed to sustain hostilities in the absence of a Congres-
sional declaration of war.");-Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970) ("[T]he
power to commit American military forces under various sets of circumstances is shared
by Congress and the executive."), affd sub nom. Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Drinan v. Nixon, 364 F. Supp. 854, 859 (D.
Mass. 1973) ("There is ample authority to support the proposition that Congress does
not have the exclusive right to determine whether or not the United States will engage
in war."); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 705 (E.D. Pa.) ("[T]he courts that have
considered the war-making power of the United States have all agreed that such power
is shared by the executive and legislature to the exclusion of the courts."), affd, 411
U.S. 911 (1973).
For an overview of a variety of theories that have been used to justify presidential
war-making, see Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538, 540-45 (N.D. Cal. 1970), rev'd
on other grounds, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972).
so Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970), affd sub nom. Orlando v.
Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971).
81 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
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Act. The Act may be interpreted as having any of three different ef-
fects; these different interpretations incorporate the two assumptions
discussed in part IV as to the constitutional allocation of war powers.
The first two interpretations start from the premise that Congress
has exclusive control of the war powers and that any presidential use of
military force without congressional approval would be unconstitutional
unless it fell within the exception related to repelling sudden attacks.82
The first views the Act as having no legislative effect whatsoever-the
Act merely sets forth a congressional plan of action to be followed
should the President act in an unconstitutional manner. The Act makes
clear the possible responses: Congress can make explicit its disapproval
by passing a concurrent resolution calling for termination of the action;
it can ratify or authorize the President's action post hoc; or it can do
nothing, relying on the sixty-day limit to force a termination of the
action.
A second interpretation of the Act, also premised on congressional
control of the war powers, views the Act as delegating limited war-
making authority to the President. From this perspective, the War
Powers Act constitutes congressional authorization to the President to
wage war for up to sixty days.8"
A third interpretation of the Act rests on the assumption that the
war powers are constitutionally shared between Congress and the Pres-
ident, there being no clear delineation of each branch's powers. The
classic description of this situation is found in Justice Jackson's concur-
ring opinion in the Steel Seizure Case.8 There, Jackson stated that
"[p]residential powers are not fixed, but fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress." '8 He then
82 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
83 See T. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 221 (1974) (decrying the
Nixon administration's interpretation of the Act as a general delegation of congres-
sional war powers to the President).
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1952). This
Comment relies upon the Jackson taxonomy to illustrate the separation of powers is-
sues inherent in the War Powers Act, without claiming that it gives a definitive solu-
tion. As Justice Rehnquist noted,
Although we have in the past found and do today find Justice Jack-
son's classification of executive actions into three general categories analyt-
ically useful . . . it is doubtless the case that executive action in any par-
ticular instance falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at
some point along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authori-
zation to explicit congressional prohibition.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981).
For background information on the Steel Seizure Case, see M. MARCUS, TRUMAN
AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977).
85 Youngstown Sheet and Tube, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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identified three zones of presidential power:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or im-
plied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maxi-
mum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right
plus all that Congress can delegate ...
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as
a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on inde-
pendent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract
theories of law.
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its
lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitu-
tional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter .... so
Thus, the constitutionality of presidential action must be judged by
the scope of the President's independent authority to exercise certain
power (for example, the war powers) and by the restraints that may
legitimately be placed upon presidential exercise of that power by the
other branches.
Relying on this perspective on the separation of powers between
the two branches, this third interpretation sees the War Powers Act as
neither a delegation nor a nondelegation of congressional war powers to
the President. Rather, it views the Act as a recognition that these pow-
ers are shared by Congress and the President, with the President's
powers falling into Jackson's "zone of twilight." According to this in-
terpretation, however, the Act provides Congress with a mechanism
with which it can shift presidential action from this middle zone to the
third zone, thereby reducing presidential power to its "lowest ebb" by
placing it in direct conflict with the expressed will of Congress. That
mechanism is the concurrent resolution provision.
86 Id. at 635-37 (footnotes omitted).
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V. THE WAR POWERS ACT AFTER Chadha
Drawing on part III's discussion of two perspectives on the consti-
tutional allocation of war powers between Congress and the President,
part IV suggested three interpretations of the War Powers Act. Each
interpretation has different implications for the constitutionality of the
concurrent resolution termination provision of the Act; this part consid-
ers that provision in light of Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Chadha.
87
Because the lawfulness of the concurrent resolution provision may
turn on which of the three interpretations of the Act prevails, this part
assesses the provision in the context of each interpretation. To deter-
mine the constitutionality of the provision, the effect of passage of a
concurrent resolution ordering a termination of presidentially initiated
hostilities, as such effect is suggested by each interpretation, is mea-
sured against the two principles articulated in Chadha: (1) legislative
action purporting to alter the legal rights of persons outside the legisla-
tive branch must comply with the constitutional procedure set forth in
article I, including presentment to the President; and (2) congressional
authority, once delegated to the executive, may not be altered or re-
voked extra-legislatively. 8
A. Congressional Power-No Delegation
If Congress has the exclusive right to exercise the war powers and
the War Powers Act expresses Congress's determination not to delegate
war-making authority to the President except by declaration of war or
by other specific statutory authorization,"9 the concurrent resolution
provision is not invalidated by Chadha. First, as to the effect on the
legal rights of those outside the legislature, passage of a concurrent res-
olution under the Act would not alter the President's right to wage war
because, from this vantage, the President possesses no war power that a
resolution could alter. Unlike the legislative veto at issue in Chadha,
which purportedly changed the executive's power to control Chadha's
status, adoption of a concurrent resolution under the Act would only
express Congress's belief that the President is acting unconstitutionally.
It would not purport to affect the President's constitutional powers or
duties and thus would not be subject to the procedural requirements of
article I.
87 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983).
88 See supra text following note 61.
81 See supra text following note 82.
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With respect to the delegation principle, congressional use of the
Act's concurrent resolution provision would also be distinguishable
from the legislative veto at issue in Chadha. In the Immigration and
Nationality Act9° Congress delegated a measure of its constitutional
power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization," 1 to the execu-
tive. If the War Powers Act does not delegate authority, the adoption of
a concurrent resolution under the Act would not alter or revoke an
existing delegation of authority to the executive branch, as the Chadha
majority claimed occurred when Congress vetoed the immigration
judge's suspension of Chadha's deportation.92 Rather, if one accepts the
characterization of the concurrent resolution as Congress's statement to
the President "that it did not wish to declare war,"93 passage of the
resolution would be nothing more than a specific refusal by Congress to
authorize the President to make war.
This characterization of the concurrent resolution resembles the
analysis set out by Justice White in his Chadha dissent. He analogized
the executive branch's decision to suspend Chadha's deportation to a
"proposal for legislation";94 the legislative veto simply constituted one
House's refusal to adopt the executive's proposal. This analysis holds
considerable logical appeal with respect to the concurrent resolution
provision of the War Powers Act.
As Senator Javits noted, the nondelegation language95 and the con-
current resolution provision were intended to place
a big responsibility upon the President as well as the Con-
gress. The initiative in generating 'specific statutory authori-
zation' to meet contingencies and developing crises may in
most instances come from the President. As the conductor of
foreign policy, with all the information and intelligence re-
sources at his command, it will be incumbent upon him to
present the case to Congress and the nation.98
Thus, Justice White's "proposal for legislation" theory is relevant to
presidential action under the Act. Lacking constitutional authority to
maintain a military deployment without congressional approval, the
President initiates a- proposal for legislation by complying with the
90 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1525 (1982).
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
92 See Chadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2786.
9 Hearings, supra note 44, at 93 (statement of Rep. Zablocki).
C' hadha, 103 S. Ct. at 2808 (White, J., dissenting).
9 See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
9 119 CONG. REc. 1399 (1973) (statement of Sen. Javits).
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Act's reporting requirements,9 7 starting the sixty-day clock. 8 The Pres-
ident thus proposes a war. Either the passage of a concurrent resolution
or the expiration of the sixty-day period indicates congressional refusal
to adopt the proposed "legislation." Use of the concurrent resolution,
according to Justice White's reasoning, is constitutionally permissible
because the Constitution does not require presentment to the President
of any resolution or bill which only expresses a refusal to legislate.
B. Congressional Power-Delegation
Alternatively, if Congress has exclusive control over the war pow-
ers, and the War Powers Act is viewed as a limited delegation of con-
gressional war-making power to the President,99 the concurrent resolu-
tion would seem to be an unconstitutional Chadha-type legislative veto.
From this perspective, the resolution would resemble the traditional
legislative veto: Congress delegates general authority to the executive
(to make war for sixty days) subject to a case-by-case review and veto
of executive actions (termination of hostilities by concurrent resolution).
According to Chadha, this type of extra-legislative power over dele-
gated authority subverts the systems of checks and balances and is
unconstitutional.
C. Shared Powers-Jackson's Zone of Twilight
The most plausible explanation of the War Powers Act, based on
constitutional and legislative history, is that it attempts to define execu-
tive and legislative power in a zone of shared responsibility.0 0 Assum-
ing that the war powers are shared between the two branches, Justice
Jackson's three-zone structure can be used to consider the constitution-
ality of the concurrent resolution.
Once a presidential military deployment has set into motion the
Act's reporting requirements and sixty-day period, the issue before
Congress is whether and how to respond. Congress has three options:
(1) it may grant the President specific statutory authorization for con-
tinued deployment; (2) it may do nothing and thereby require the Pres-
ident to terminate the deployment upon expiration of the sixty-day pe-
riod; or (3) it may state by concurrent resolution its refusal to authorize
the deployment and order the President to terminate it.
Should Congress exercise the third option and pass a concurrent
97 50 U.S.C. § 1543.
98 See id. § 1544(b).
" See supra text accompanying note 83.
100 See supra text accompanying note 86.
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resolution, formerly lawful presidential action would become unlawful.
Congress's enactment of a resolution purportedly recasts the President's
military deployment from the "zone of twilight" to the third zone,
where presidential power is at its lowest ebb. Congress instructs the
President to terminate a military action that was not unlawful prior to
the congressional action. It frames its instruction in a manner that does
more than refuse to legislate its approval. The resolution is a directive
stating that the military "forces shall be removed by the President."'01
Under Chadha, the Constitution demands that such a directive, if
it is "legislation"-that is, if it purports to alter the legal status of exec-
utive branch actionl' 2-be presented to the President for signature or
veto. The concurrent resolution provision of the War Powers Act
clearly attempts to change the legal status of presidential action, to shift
that action from the "zone of twilight" to Justice Jackson's third zone,
where Presidential action is highly suspect and potentially illegal. Like
the veto resolution in Chadha, the concurrent resolution here purports
to have the force of a statute. It would be unconstitutional unless
presented to the President.
CONCLUSION
Congressional concern over the ineffectiveness of "presidential
wars" and congressional realization that the courts would not impose
limits on presidential war-making led to enactment of the War Powers
Act in 1973. A central part of the Act was a provision that allowed
Congress, by passage of a concurrent resolution, to order termination of
presidentially initiated hostilities. Such a resolution does not have to go
to the President for approval and thus cannot be vetoed.
In Chadha, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the device
known as the legislative veto because it failed to comply with certain
procedural requirements specified in article I, including the require-
ment that legislation be presented to the President for approval. The
case raises questions about the constitutionality of the concurrent reso-
lution provision of the War Powers Act because of the provision's re-
semblance to the legislative veto struck down in Chadha.
This Comment has argued that the constitutionality of the concur-
rent resolution provision in the Act will depend upon how the Consti-
tution is interpreted to allocate the war powers between the Congress
and the President and how the Act affects that allocation. If Congress
has exclusive control over the war powers and the Act does not delegate
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any of that power to the President, the passage of a concurrent resolu-
tion ordering an end to hostilities would not, according to Chadha, be
unconstitutional.
Under a different interpretation of the constitutional allocation of
war powers, however, exercise of the concurrent resolution provision
may be unconstitutional. First, if Congress has exclusive control over
the war powers but the Act delegates some of those powers to the exec-
utive, passage of a concurrent resolution would be constitutionally void
in light of the Chadha principles. Likewise, if the war powers are
shared by the two branches and passage of a concurrent resolution rep-
resents an effort by Congress to render unlawful previously lawful
presidential action; use of the concurrent resolution provision would vi-
olate the Constitution.

